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Prior literature’s inability to document an empirical relation between non-audit service 
fees and compromised auditor independence contradicts the significant and long-standing 
concerns expressed by regulators and the investing community. The purpose of this paper is to 
reconcile the lack of findings in prior research with regulators’ and investors’ concerns about 
non-audit services. Using a new measure – goodwill impairments – that alleviates many of the 
potential limitations that could have prevented prior research from documenting evidence to 
support the proposed relation between non-audit services and auditor independence, I find that 
the level of non-audit fees of a client is negatively associated with the likelihood of recording a 
goodwill impairment in settings where the market indicates goodwill may be impaired. Further 
examinations of these findings suggest that the lack of results in prior literature could be related 
to limitations in the settings being tested in those papers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Independence is the foundation of the benefits thatinvestors derive from external 
auditors. Any weakening of this independence reduces th  value of information provided by the 
auditor to the capital markets. The potential for diminished independence in the auditor-client 
relationship, specifically in the presence of significant non-audit service fees, has long been a 
concern of regulators and other users of financial statements.1 By the early 2000’s, concerns had 
elevated to the point that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took significant 
steps to combat potential independence fears by imple enting multiple restrictions on the types 
of non-audit services the auditor can provide to their audit clients. These restrictions include 
services such as bookkeeping, financial information systems design, and appraisal or valuation 
services.2 The SEC also ensured audit committee involvement in the purchase of non-audit 
services by requiring the committee to pre-approve those additional services (SEC 2002b). 
Although regulators have taken some action in an attempt to ensure auditors remain independent, 
research has generally found little consistent evidence to confirm the existence of a detrimental 
impact of non-audit services on auditor independence (Blay and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 
2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). This lack of evidence also contradicts a related stream 
of literature that indicates investors are also concer ed about companies’ purchases of non-audit 
services from their external auditor (Higgs and Skantz 2006; Khurana and Raman 2006; 
Krishnan et al. 2005). The inconsistency between these two streams of literature seems to go 
                                                 
 
1 Throughout the paper, any discussion of non-audit services and/or the related fees for those services ref rs to 
additional non-audit services purchased from the company’s current external auditor. The fees are as cl ssified by 
Audit Analytics and follow both classification guidelines from the SEC and prior literature in this area. 
2 Although several non-audit services were restricted, an extensive list of permissible non-audit services remains. 
This list includes services such as benefit plan audits, assistance related to mergers and acquisition, attestation 
services, accounting consultations, tax compliance, tax planning, tax advice, and operational audits. 
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against conventional markets wisdom. Why are investors concerned about something that seems 
to have little or no bearing on their investments? 
There are two possible explanations for prior research’s failure to find consistent 
evidence that non-audit service fees impair auditor independence. It is certainly possible that the 
lack of results is an accurate reflection of the fact that non-audit fees do not actually impair 
independence. However, it is also possible that certain limitations in the approaches used in these 
prior studies prevented them from finding evidence of the relation between non-audit fees and 
independence, even though such a relation exists. The purpose of this paper is to improve our 
ability to interpret the reasons for prior research’s lack of evidence by employing a new measure 
– goodwill impairments – that is not subject to many of the limitations of prior research. 
A primary issue found in prior literature is that it is difficult to use financial statement 
outputs to infer independence compromises. The problem arises because one must be able to 
determine what the measure ‘would have been’ if independence were not compromised in order 
to determine if it changed in response to an independence compromise. Several measures used in 
prior research on non-audit fees, such as restatements and discretionary accruals, suffer from this 
sample construction issue. A primary benefit to examining goodwill impairments is that capital 
markets can be used to create an appropriate sample of companies with a high probability of 
having their goodwill impaired, as a market-to-book ratio less than one suggests that something 
on the books is overvalued (Beatty and Weber 2006; Churyk 2005; Harrington et al. 2012). 
While going concerns are often used in an attempt to alleviate the aforementioned 
‘counterfactual’ observations concern (i.e. researchers create a sample of distressed companies), 
they still suffer some from this issue and several others. A primary benefit that impairments offer 
over going concerns is that impairments occur across a broad spectrum of the corporate 
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population. Going concerns, on the other hand, are limited in their occurrences, which could 
result in a lack of power in testing. Additionally, the use of going concerns introduces several 
potential biases against finding any results. One concern is that auditors may simply be unwilling 
to weaken their independence for a company in which they have substantial concerns about 
future viability. Furthermore, going concern reporting can have strong legal liability 
implications. Even if auditors are not concerned about future viability, they may be concerned 
about litigation arising if a going concern is not properly issued. Unlike going concerns, goodwill 
impairments occur over a wide range of companies and settings and should be generally less 
susceptible to these potential biases.  
Prior to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142 (SFAS 142), goodwill 
accounting was fairly straightforward. It required little involvement from the auditor and, 
consequently, was relatively useless as a testing measure for audit related questions. The passage 
of SFAS 142, however, dramatically changed the process of accounting for goodwill. It brought 
about the end of the goodwill amortization era and the beginning of annual impairment testing. 
The introduction of ongoing impairment monitoring si nificantly changed the role of the auditor 
relating to goodwill. The auditor must now devote significant time to the testing of this balance, 
ensuring that management has properly assessed and, if ecessary, written down goodwill. 
Significant auditor involvement in this area requiring subjective judgments could present the 
opportunity for an auditor to be influenced by their financial ties to a client. The combination of 
subjective judgments, competing auditor-client incentives, and significant auditor consequences, 
along with the potential alleviation of prior research limitations, suggests goodwill impairments 
may provide a better setting for testing the impact of non-audit fees on auditor independence.  
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To test for the weakening of auditor independence i the presence of non-audit fees, I 
employ a sample of 3,615 firms with a material leve of goodwill and a market-to-book ratio less 
than one.3 Having a material level of goodwill ensures that there is the potential for a material 
goodwill impairment. The market-to-book threshold provides a situation in which the market has 
signaled that something on the books is over-valued, creating a setting with a more appropriate 
group of observations for testing auditor independence. Using this sample, I examine whether the 
existing auditor’s propensity to require an impairment write-down of goodwill is associated with 
the level of non-audit services provided to that audit client. The findings of this analysis suggest 
that the level of non-audit fees of a client reduces the likelihood of impairment in settings where 
the market indicates goodwill may be impaired. Further examinations of these findings suggest 
that the lack of results in prior literature could be related to limitations in the setting being tested. 
Additional analyses provide further support for thefinding of a negative relation between 
non-audit fees and goodwill impairments. The first additional test measures the impact that non-
audit fees have on the amount of a goodwill impairment taken. This analysis offer insights into 
whether clients that have a larger influence on their auditor through a higher level of non-audit 
fees may receive preferential treatment in the relative amount of impairment. The results of these 
tests suggest that clients who pay higher amounts of non-audit fees do impair lower amounts 
relative to other clients. A second additional analysis measures whether non-audit fees have an 
impact on the timeliness of goodwill impairments. This analysis provides evid nce as to whether 
                                                 
 
3 Materiality is defined as 0.5 percent of revenues. I employ this materiality threshold to focus on only those 
impairment transactions most likely to be of consequence to a company. This cut-off is in line with survey responses 
from eight of the nine largest U.S. audit firms: BDO USA, LLP; Crowe Horwath LLP; Deloitte & Touche LLP; 
Ernst & Young LLP; Grant Thornton LLP; KPMG LLP; McGladrey LLP; and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
(Eilifsen and Messier Jr. 2013). I test the sensitivity of this threshold in the additional analyses and robustness 
section of the paper. 
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clients who buy greater amounts of non-audit servics are allowed a delay in recording an 
impairment. Findings indicate that these clients do in fact take longer to impair their goodwill. 
Taken together with the results from the main analysis, these findings suggest that non-audit 
service fees have a significant and negative relation with goodwill impairments. 
This paper provides a significant contribution to the existing independence literature by 
helping to reconcile the concerns of investors and regulations with the lack of findings in prior 
independence literature. Specifically, I employ a new measure to alleviate several possible 
research limitations occurring in prior research. Differing from most prior studies, the results 
using this measure suggest that auditors receiving higher levels of non-audit fees may behave in 
a less independent manner. This reduction in independence is evidenced through the significant 
and negative relation between non-audit fees and the likelihood, amount, and timeliness of 
goodwill impairments. Further, analyses provide some evidence that the lack of results found in 
prior studies may have been due to limitations in the sample of data being employed. Taken 
together, these findings offer some reconciliation between the documented investor concerns and 
the lack of evidence indicating any actual impairment of independence and suggest that the 
understanding of that relation may be less complete than previously thought.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
background information and hypothesis development. The proposed research design and sample 
selection process are outlined in Section III. Results are discussed in Section IV and Section V 
considers the potential sample limitations of prior research. Section VI presents several 




II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 As discussed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the purpose of an audit 
is to provide the public with “additional assurance — beyond managements' own assertions — 
that a company's financial statements can be relied upon” (SEC 2002a). During this discussion, 
they also cite the following statement from the U.S. Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Arthur 
Young: "The SEC requires the filing of audited financial statements in order to obviate the fear 
of loss from reliance on inaccurate information, thereby encouraging public investment in the 
Nation's industries." The independence that exists between auditors and their clients is 
paramount as it has important implications for investors, banks and financial institutions, and 
other parties that may transact with a company. If an auditor’s independence were to be 
compromised, it could have sizeable effects on financial decisions and capital allocation within 
the market. Echoing this sentiment in a statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, 
Insurance and Investment, the former Chief Accountant of the SEC, Lynn Turner, stated: 
“[Auditors] have an extremely important role as a gtekeeper to the capital 
markets both in the United States as well as abroad. Independent audits provide 
investors with reasonable assurance – that is high but not absolute assurance – the 
financial statements are correct and complete within t e boundaries of materiality. 
It is the objectivity – the independence – of the auditor that creates the value of an 
audit. Without that independence and objectivity, an audit has no value. As the 
increasing complexity of business transactions, products and structures result in 
more subjective accounting standards, they also continue to create the need for 
judgment on the part of auditors. Subjective, very judgmental decisions by the 
auditor also greatly enhance the need for objectivity and professional skepticism 
on the part of auditors.” (Turner 2011) 
 
While this discussion highlights some of the reasons why auditor independence is 
extremely important, it is also necessary to understand what may impair this independence. 
DeAngelo (1981) defines auditor independence as “the conditional probability of reporting a 
discovered breach” in the clients accounting system and suggests that it is one of the two critical 
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components of audit quality. She argues that the “incumbent auditors have some incentive to 
lower quality opportunistically in order to retain the client in future periods. This incentive 
occurs because clients can impose real costs on auditors by termination (loss of the wealth 
equivalent of the client-specific quasi-rent stream). Therefore clients can potentially extract 
accounting concessions from incumbent auditors by a credible threat of termination.” The 
incentive to compromise independence could be particularly strong for clients with a large 
amount of highly profitable non-audit service fees. 
Furthering the concerns expressed by DeAngelo (1981) is the long-standing concern that 
auditors collecting fees directly from clients advances the potential for independence deviations. 
These concerns, among others, led the SEC to direct companies to disclose the amount and types 
of fees paid to their auditor – a disclosure process that went into effect on February 5, 2001 (SEC 
2001). Beyond fee disclosure, the SEC also introduce  requirements as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) that limited the types of non-audit services that could be performed 
and took action to ensure that the audit committee would be involved in the process of 
purchasing any non-audit services (SEC 2002b).4  
In response to regulators’ concerns and the related changes introduced, several academics 
have examined the relation between non-audit fees and auditor independence. Studies in this area 
have included investor responses as well as direct attempts at finding instances of independence 
                                                 
 
4 These requirements prohibit an auditor from “contemporaneously” providing a public company auditing client 
with the following specific types of consulting or ther non-audit services: bookkeeping or other servic s related to 
the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial information systems design and 
implementation; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services; 
internal audit outsourcing services; management functio s or human resources; broker or dealer, investm n  adviser, 
or investment banking services; legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; anyother service that the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
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concerns using proxies for failed audits.5 Prior literature investigating investor response has 
documented several instances of concern about non-audit fees. Testing investor perception, 
Krishnan et al. (2005) investigate the association between fee-based measures of non-audit 
service purchases and earnings response coefficients (ERCs). They find that the non-audit fee 
ratio and the level of non-audit fees were negatively associated with ERCs. Higgs and Skantz 
(2006) also use ERCs to assess investor perception of fees. For audit fees, the authors find 
evidence consistent with the market interpreting abnormally high audit fees as a signal of high 
earnings quality. When analyzing non-audit fees, however, the authors find evidence that 
abnormally high non-audit fees impair perceived auditor independence. Further testing investor 
perception of non-audit fees, Khurana and Raman (2006) employ the client-specific ex ante cost 
of equity capital as a proxy for investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility. They find 
that the higher the non-audit fees paid to the auditor, the greater the implied threat to auditor 
independence and the lower the financial reporting credibility of a Big 5 audit.6 Taken together, 
these results provide evidence that investors perceive non-audit fees as a detriment to auditor 
independence. 
While the concerns expressed by investors suggest non-audit fees are problematic, studies 
have failed to find much consistent evidence of auditors actually impairing their independence 
                                                 
 
5 Proxies commonly include issuance of a going concern, r statements, and discretionary accruals. Measur s such as 
restatements and discretionary accruals, however, generally lack a definable group of counter factual observations in 
which to properly test the independence portion of overall audit quality. As a result, these other measures have 
generally provided little consistent support for the idea that auditors impair their independence (Frankel et al. 2002; 
Jong-Hag et al. 2010; Kinney Jr et al. 2004; Krishnan et al. 2011; Paterson and Valencia 2011; Reynolds et al. 
2004). 
6 Other parties have also expressed concerns. Schmidt (2012) finds that when plaintiff attorneys argue that auditor 
independence was impaired due to dependence on non-audit fees, restatement-related audit litigation is more likely 
to result in an auditor settlement and a larger amount f settlement. She concludes that audit litigants act as if they 
believe non-audit fees will strengthen the case against the auditor. 
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(Callaghan et al. 2009; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009).7 This general lack 
of evidence was highlighted by Francis (2006) when  commented on the overall findings from 
the non-audit services (NAS) line of research, stating that there is “a growing body of empirical 
evidence that questions whether there is any logical rationale for restricting the scope of the 
services that auditors provide to their audit clients. In reviewing the NAS research literature over 
the past 40 years, one has to conclude that there is no ‘smoking gun’ evidence linking the 
provision of non-audit services with audit failures.” More recent findings from Blay and Geiger 
(2013), however, suggest that some apprehension may be warranted. Studying behavior in the 
post-SOX era, they find some evidence that a higher level of concurrent non-audit fees is 
associated with a lower propensity to issue a going concern modification. Blay and Geiger 
(2013) note, however, that their “findings related o going concern decisions and NAS fees in the 
United States are sensitive to both the time period examined and the selection of appropriate 
control samples of distressed non-GCM firms.”  
To date, going concerns have generally been thought to provide the best opportunity for 
gaining insight on auditor independence. They offer a significant benefit from the perspective 
that the going concern decision process is both under the control of the auditor and unobservable 
to the public (Blay and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Reynolds and Francis 2000). While 
that benefit is certainly of value, going concern modifications also have several limitations, 
especially when compared with goodwill impairments. Testing independence using the 
propensity to properly issue a going concern requires construction of a sample of companies that 
“should have” received a going concern. This requires assumptions to be made about how to 
                                                 
 
7 While little consistent evidence has been obtained from studies in the United States, findings from other countries 
have provided some support for the idea that non-audit fees impair auditor independence (Basioudis et al. 2008; 
Firth 2002; Sharma and Sidhu 2001). 
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properly define a financially distressed company. As highlighted in the findings of Blay and 
Geiger (2013), these assumptions can lead to significa t changes in results. By comparison, the 
capital markets can help create a sample of likely goodwill impairments by using instances when 
book value exceeds market value (Beatty and Weber 2006; Churyk 2005; Harrington et al. 
2012).8 Additionally, going concerns modifications are received by only a small number of 
companies, greatly reducing the power of any tests xamining them. By definition, going 
concerns are also constrained to the most distressed companies, companies that also tend to be 
small in nature. A primary benefit of employing goodwill impairments to measure independence 
is that impairments occur much more frequently and do so across a much broader spectrum of 
the corporate population. Furthermore, going concerns are also given in situations where the 
auditor has substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue for the next year. It is 
unclear why an auditor would compromise their independence for a client that they believe has a 
highly questionable future viability. While still a negative signal, goodwill impairment is not 
indicative of impending failure of a company. Finally, going concerns have been shown to 
generate potential legal liability (Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Kaplan and Williams 2013; Lys 
and Watts 1994). This factor likely makes going concer s a highly sensitive area to auditors, an 
attribute that may reduce the likelihood of a deviation in independence. Unlike going concerns, 
goodwill impairments are not known to have an associati n with auditor related litigation.9 
                                                 
 
8 Generally speaking, if a company has something on their books that is over-valued and also has a material l vel of 
goodwill, a goodwill impairment is a very likely first step to correcting the valuation difference. I employ this 
threshold in an attempt to narrow down likely impairers and am not suggesting that all companies that do not impair 
are operating outside of GAAP.  
9 In addition, goodwill impairments, unlike going concerns, are not an all or nothing proposition. They offer an 
opportunity to assess magnitude effects in addition to the prior studied issue/no issue situations. They also offer an 
opportunity to measure a timing effect of when a goodwill impairment occurs. These additional characteris ics are 
further explored in additional analyses. 
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While the prior discussion outlines some of the potential research benefits of using 
goodwill impairments in testing auditor independence, it is critically important that goodwill 
impairments also possess the necessary market and auditor consequences to have merit as a test 
measure. Several papers have documented negative market consequence associated with 
recording a goodwill impairment. Churyk (2005) reports that impairments are value relevant and 
are impounded into stock prices by investors. Further, Bens et al. (2011) provide evidence that 
unexpected impairments are associated with a negativ  investor reaction. Additionally, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) find a significantly negative relation between goodwill write-offs and 
the market value of firms in the United Kingdom suggesting that investors incorporate these 
losses into their assessment of firm value. Finally, Li et al. (2011) find that after a firm 
announces an impairment loss, analysts, as well as inve tors, revise their expectations of future 
profitability. 
In addition to these market consequences, many academics and practitioners believe that, 
due to the judgment required, goodwill impairments are “likely to be manipulated” and used to 
“manage financial reports opportunistically” (Ramann  and Watts 2012; Watts 2003). Prior 
literature has documented instances of this occurring by highlighting how management uses 
impairments to manage earnings. Beatty and Weber (2006) find that firms are less apt to write 
down goodwill when the impairment may cause a debt covenant violation or a potential issue 
with exchange listing requirements. They also find that firms with earnings-based bonus plans 
and companies with CEOs that have been in the position for a relatively long period of time are 
less likely to record a goodwill impairment. In addition, Ramanna and Watts (2012) find some 
evidence that managers are influenced by concerns rlated to debt covenant violations, executive 
compensation, and CEO reputation which can lead them to avoid goodwill write-offs even when 
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there are market indications that their company’s goodwill is impaired. Exploring the underlying 
motivations managers have to delay goodwill write-offs, Muller et al. (2012)  find that managers 
use the time for their personal gain by selling shares in the two years prior to the announcement 
of a goodwill write-off. These management actions highlight the importance of auditor 
independence when testing goodwill for potential impairment. Higher levels of independence 
should result in clearer auditor judgment and a relted lower risk of goodwill being manipulated 
by management. 
From an audit perspective, the often-conflicting goals of managers and auditors suggest 
that the goodwill impairment process can be one of tension in the auditor-client relationship. A 
potential result of this tension is highlighted by A res et al. (2014), who document an increase in 
auditor switching after a goodwill impairment has occurred. The presence of these significant 
consequences suggests that auditor incentives in the goodwill impairment process could become 
mixed. The previously highlighted benefits of examining goodwill impairments over other 
measures, along with these substantial consequences to the auditor, suggest that goodwill 
impairments are an ideal setting for testing auditor independence. By using goodwill 
impairments to help alleviate the potential limitations of prior research, I evaluate the relation 
between non-audit fees and auditor independence and test the following hypothesis (stated in 
null form): 
H1: There is no relation between the level of non-audit fees paid by a client and 




III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
3.1 Research Methodology 
 
To test H1, I assess the effect of non-audit fees on the likelihood of goodwill impairment 
by performing estimations of the following logistic regression model: 
IMPit = β0 + β1 LN_NONAUDITit + βx CONTROLSit + IND_FE + YEAR_FE + εit (1)  
where i denotes firm, t denotes year, and: 
IMP = 1 if firm recorded a material goodwill impairment 
(defined as greater than 0.5 percent of revenue) during the 
fiscal year, 0 otherwise. 
LN_NONAUDIT = natural log of the sum of non-audit fees paid to current 
fiscal year auditor. 
CONTROLS   = vector of control variables. 
IND_FE   = industry fixed effects. 
YEAR_FE   = year fixed effects.     
ε    = error term.  
 
The dependent variable IMP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company recorded a 
material goodwill impairment during the fiscal year nd 0 otherwise. Consistent with prior 
research, the variable of interest in this model is the natural log of non-audit fees 
(LN_NONAUDIT) (Blay and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). 
As described in Section II, H1 tests whether the level of non-audit fees is associated with the 
likelihood of impairment. An insignificant coefficient on the variables of interest would suggest 
a lack of association between non-audit fees and the probability of a goodwill impairment. A 
negative and significant coefficient would indicate that higher levels of non-audit fees are 
associated with a reduced likelihood of receiving a oodwill impairment, while a positive and 
significant coefficient would suggest that the additional exposure garnered through non-audit 
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services is actually associated with an increase in the likelihood that an auditor requires a 
goodwill impairment. 
Several control variables from prior literature are also included in this multivariate 
analysis. I include LN_AUDITFEES to control for the level of audit fees paid by thecli nt (Blay 
and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). LN_MKVALT is the 
natural log of the company’s market value of equity and is included to control for client size.   
Following Beatty and Weber (2006), I include the percentage that a company’s market value of 
assets is below book value of assets (IMP_PCT) to control for market perceptions of a client’s 
valuation. In addition to these current period market valuation factors, I also control for the 
company’s market return over the current year (ANN_RETURN) and the standard deviation of 
that return (STDEV). GDWL_PCT is the pre-impairment percentage of a firm’s assets that are 
composed of goodwill (Ramanna and Watts 2012). LEVERAGE is the ratio of total short- and 
long-term interest bearing debt to pre-impairment company book value. To control for the fact 
the goodwill impairments occur on a segment-by-segment basis, and the related change in 
potential impairment that occurs with an increasing number of segments, I also control for the 
natural log of the total number of operating segments of the firm (Francis and Yu 2009).10 
Several other firm performance characteristics are also included. LOSS is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one if the firm incurred a pre-impairment loss for the fiscal year ended (Hayn and 
Hughes 2006). ROA is the company’s pre-impairment net income divided by the average total 
assets for the year (Gu and Lev 2011). EBITDA_CHANGE is the change in a company’s 
EBITDA from time t-1 to time t divided by the total firm market value of equity. GW_ACQ is an 
                                                 
 
10 Because goodwill is tested on a segment-by-by-segment basis, multiple segments within a firm could ad noise to 
the model. To eliminate this noise, I reperform analyses on the 2,051 observations with only one reporting segment. 
Results remain unchanged. 
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indicator variable included for observations in which the company performed an acquisition that 
increased goodwill during the current year ended (AbuGhazaleh et al. 2011). Furthermore, I 
control for the type of auditor engaged by the firm as those that employ a Big N auditor (BIGN) 
may receive audits of a higher quality and are subsequently more likely to properly impair 
goodwill. In addition to these company specific contr ls, I also control for any industry 
(IND_FE) or year (YEAR_FE) specific characteristics. Industries are classified using two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
company level. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
Table 1 presents the sample construction. I first obtain financial data from Compustat for 
all companies with fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2003 and ending by May 31, 2012 
(Compustat fiscal years 2004 through 2011).  Although SFAS 142 went into effect for fiscal 
years beginning on or after December 15, 2001, the later beginning date allows for testing 
relations after a ‘settling in’ of the significant regulatory changes implemented during the early 
part of the decade.11 The amount of audit fees and the amount of non-audit fees are variables 
obtained from Audit Analytics, while stock returns data is collected from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP). To limit situations in which the impairment decision is likely 
inconsequential or does not involve auditor scrutiny, only firms with material (larger than 0.5 
percent of revenues) amounts of pre-impairment goodwill are retained within the sample. 
Additionally, the sample is limited to companies with a market value that is materially less than 
                                                 
 
11 To test the sensitivity of results to this time period cutoff, I reperform analyses using all observations since the 
implementation of SFAS 142. Results remain unchanged. 
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book value (a market-to-book ratio materially less than one).12 This constraint further limits the 
sample to instances where the market has indicated some type of impairment is likely warranted 
(Beatty and Weber 2006; Churyk 2005; Harrington et al. 2012), a setting more proper for testing 
auditor independence. To be included in the analysis, the observations must contain all requisite 
financial data from Compustat, all fee related data from Audit Analytics, and stock return data 
from CRSP. 
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
 
                                                 
 
12 I require that market value that is materially less than book value to ensure a company has the ability to record a 
material goodwill impairment without having to surpass a market-to-book ratio equal to one. To ensure results are 
not sensitive to this cutoff, I reperform analyses on a sample that includes the 82 observations that have a market-to-





4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 3,615 firm-
year observations. Approximately 35 percent of the companies in the sample have a material 
impairment. On average, companies in the sample pay non-audit fees of $477,000 to their current 
auditor.13 These same companies also pay an average of $2,078,00  in audit fees annually for an 
average of approximately $2.56 million in total fees annually. From an audit related perspective, 
about 56 percent of the companies in the sample hava Big N auditor. As expected from the 
sample construction, companies have an average market value of assets that is 13 percent less 
than book value of assets (IMP_PCT).14 On average, companies in the sample exhibit a negativ  
change in earnings as well as a negative return on assets.15 
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
 Panel B of Table 2 presents a comparison of means between the subsample of companies 
having a goodwill impairment and the subsample of companies that did not have a goodwill 
impairment. The first two columns present the observation counts and variable means for the 
impairment sample. The third and forth columns present the observation counts and variable 
means for the non-impairment sample. From a descriptive standpoint, there is no statistical 
difference between the two subsamples in terms of non-audit fees, audit fees, or total fees. Stock 
                                                 
 
13 422 observations have zero fees for non-audit services. To test the sensitivity of my results to these observations, I 
reperform analyses excluding these observations and find that results remain unchanged. 
14 Some control variables (e.g. ANN_RETURN having a mean value of negative 27.9 percent and a median value of 
negative 35.5 percent) may seem somewhat abnormal in the r magnitude, however similar to the market value of 
assets to book value of assets variable, these valus re reasonable based on the sample construction threshold that 
requires observations to have a market-to-book less than one. 
15 Descriptive statistics and other results are present d unwinsorized throughout. To test the sensitivity of this 
decision, I also reperform all analyses with all continuous control variables winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Results remain similar throughout. 
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returns are lower and the standard deviation of those returns is higher for the subsample of 
companies that had an impairment. Companies within the impairment subsample are smaller in 
size. Furthermore, the two subsamples are similar in terms of number of business segments.16 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 Table 3 presents the results of the estimations of model (1). This table employs IMP as 
the dependent variable and is the main test for H1. The negative and significant coefficient on 
LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.01) indicates that non-audit fees are inversely related to a company’s 
likelihood of receiving a goodwill impairment. In contrast to the finding for non-audit fees, there 
is a positive and significant relation between audit fees and goodwill impairments (p < 0.01). 
This result is similar to the findings of Jarva (201 ), who finds that companies that write-off 
goodwill pay higher audit fees.17 These results indicate that the null hypothesis pre ented in H1 
can be rejected. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
The coefficients on the control variables generally load as expected and are consistent 
with prior research. The positive and significant coefficient on BIGN indicates that companies 
with a Big N auditor are more likely to impair goodwill than those without a Big N auditor. 
                                                 
 
16 The difference in some characteristics between the two subsamples suggests that any results could potentially be 
driven by differences in observable characteristics between the groups. I employ a propensity score matching 
technique that matches all goodwill impairment companies with the most similar company that did not receive a 
goodwill impairment to help alleviate any concerns that these differences may be driving results. See robustness for 
further discussion. 
17 Although the opposing findings for non-audit fees and audit fees may at first seem contradictory, these r sults are 
consistent with traditional investor fee arguments noted by the AICPA (2004) and the findings of Higgs and Skantz 
(2006) which, taken together, suggest that investors value high audit fees because they are related to ither (1) an 
audit of a higher quality or (2) an audit that requires more work, and are concerned with non-audit fees because the 
related additional work is seen as very profitable for the auditor, making it a highly desirable annuity. In this way, a 
“dollar is not necessarily a dollar” given the source it is derived from may differ significantly in profitability. The 
results of these analyses are consistent with each of these fee contentions. 
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Other control variables generally follow expectations and prior literature. As suggested by Beatty 
and Weber (2006), there is a positive relation betwe n how far the market value of assets is 
below book value of assets (IMP_PCT) and the likelihood of impairment. The likelihood of
impairment also increases for companies with a loss(Hayn and Hughes 2006), for companies 
with a larger standard deviation of stock price over th  preceding year (Beatty and Weber 2006), 
for more highly levered companies, and companies with a higher percentage of their total assets 
represented by goodwill. Consistent with Gu and Lev (2011), the likelihood of impairment 
appears to decrease as ROA increases. Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast o expectations, 
the findings indicate that companies with an increase in earnings are more likely to impair. This 
result could be due to a higher willingness to impair for those companies that have experienced 
other positive news.  
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V. CONSIDERATIONS OF PRIOR SAMPLE LIMITATIONS 
 
A primary assertion of this study is that prior research employing going concerns has 
potentially suffered from sample limitations that may affect the ability to draw inferences. To 
test the validity of this assertion, I use goodwill impairments to assess the potential impact that 
these sample limitations may have had on prior research’s ability to document any effects of 
non-audit fees on auditor independence. Specifically, I employ the goodwill impairment setting 
and separately evaluate 1) the effects of limited power, 2) the potential of bias due to concerns 
over future viability, and 3) the potential of bias due to litigation risk.18  
5.1 Potential Limitation from Sample Power 
 
Tests employing going concerns are generally limited to between 100 and 180 first-time 
going concern opinions, along with another 1,000 to 1,500 “distressed” counterfactuals (Blay 
and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). The small number of 
going concerns may limit the ability to detect an association with non-audit fees. To construct a 
sample of goodwill impairments that is similar in power, I use the 1,270 observations that 
recorded a goodwill impairment and randomly group them into deciles of 127 observations. I 
then use the 1,172 non-impairment observations below the median market value of assets to 
book value of assets to construct a counterfactual sample of those firms that were “most likely” 
in need of an impairment to their goodwill. I then perform estimations of model (1) on ten 
subsamples, each one consisting of one of the randomly generated deciles and the counterfactual 
                                                 
 
18 Because there is no way to capture the effect size of going concerns used in prior research and compare it to the 
effect size of goodwill impairments in this setting, the ability to draw inferences from this section s limited by the 
extent that the effect sizes differ.  Additionally, while different proxies are used to examine each potential bias 
individually, I cannot completely rule out the possibility that these proxies are capturing the effect of more than one 
of the potential biases examined. 
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group.19 The results from these regressions are presented i Table 4. As shown, the significant 
reduction in power of the impairment group had a substantial effect on the inferences that can be 
drawn. More specifically, only two of the ten subsamples have a significant coefficient (p < 0.05 
and p < 0.10). These findings suggest that the lack of power found in the previous non-audit fees 
literature could be playing a significant role in the ability of researchers to document a negative 
association between non-audit fees and auditor independence. 
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
5.2 Potential Limitations from Sample Bias 
 
5.2.1 Bias from Concerns of Future Viability   
 
To consider the possibility that auditors may just be particularly unwilling to weaken 
their independence for those companies they believe hav  no long-term viability, I reperform 
earlier analyses and include an indicator variable capturing whether or not the auditor issued a 
going concern (GC). I use the going concern variable as it provides the most direct and 
observable insight into auditor’s beliefs about a company’s future viability. I also include an 
interaction between GC and LN_NONAUDIT. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 
5. As shown, there is a negative and significant coefficient on the standalone variable 
LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.01). This indicates a strong result for those clients not receiving a going 
concern modification. The insignificant linear combination suggests that there is no such relation 
with non-audit fees for those companies that do receiv  a going concern. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on this linear combination is positive, suggesting these observations are not close to 
                                                 
 
19 Although industry fixed effects are included in all other analyses, I omit them from these smaller sample size 
regressions. This limits the loss of data caused by a lack of variation in the dependent variable within each industry 




being negative and significant like their counterparts that received a clean opinion. It is also 
noteworthy that the interaction variable, which tests the difference between the two subsamples, 
is both positive and approaching significance (p = 0.14 two-tail). Although the presence of going 
concern modifications is small (just over four percent of the sample received one), these results 
provide some evidence that auditors may not weaken independence for those clients that they 
believe to have the most questionable future viability. 
<Insert Table 5 Here> 
5.2.2 Bias from the Risk of Litigation 
 
An additional source of potential bias is the possibility that auditors are less willing to 
impair their independence when the circumstances involve a higher risk of litigation. To examine 
this possibility, I reperform earlier analyses and i clude a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether or not the company belonged to an industry with high litigation risk (LITIGATION). I 
follow Francis et al. (1994) to determine those industries that are highly litigious.20,21 Similar to 
the previous analysis considering sample bias from future viability, LITIGATION is also 
interacted with LN_NONAUDIT. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 6. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the standalone variable of interest LN_NONAUDIT (p < 
0.01), indicates a strong negative relation between non-audit fees and goodwill impairment for 
those clients in non-litigious industries. The insignificant linear combination suggests that those 
companies that are in a litigious industry do not exhibit this same relation. Furthermore, the 
interaction between the litigation indicator and non-audit fees, which tests the difference between 
                                                 
 
20 Industries considered highly litigious are: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC 
codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), or retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961). 
21 Because a going concern modification can also be considered a sign of litigation risk, I reperform the analyses in 
this section by considering litigation risk as any company that either has received a going concern modification or is 
in a litigious industry as risky. Results from analyses using this specification remain unchanged. 
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the two subsamples is positive and significant (p <0.05). This result provides some evidence that 
auditors are less likely to reduce their independence for those clients that they believe are a 
higher litigation risk. 




VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS 
 
6.1 Non-Audit Fees and the Amount of Impairment 
 
One limitation when testing the relation between no-audit fees and auditor independence 
with going concern modifications is that a going con ern opinion is dichotomous in nature. In 
addition to the ability to similarly test an effect on likelihood, however, goodwill impairments 
also offer an opportunity to assess magnitude effects as the impairment amount can range 
anywhere between zero and the full amount of goodwill on the books. If non-audit fees impair 
independence, as suggested by the results of the main an lysis, clients paying higher amounts of 
those types of fees may also impair an amount lower than they would in a completely 
independent situation. The dependent variable is IMP_AMT, which is a continuous variable equal 
to the amount of a company’s goodwill impairment scaled by its pre-impairment total goodwill 
(a measure obtained from Beatty and Weber (2006)). Because the amount of impairment is often 
zero, or non-impairment, I use a tobit regression model to perform this analysis. All control 
variables are the same as those used in the main anlysis. A negative and significant coefficient 
on the variables of interest (LN_NONAUDIT) would provide evidence that higher non-audit fees 
are associated with a lower amount of impairment.  
<Insert Table 7 Here> 
 Table 7 presents the results of the estimations of the tobit model. The negative and 
significant coefficient on LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.01) suggests that the amount of impairment 
declines as the level of non-audit fees rises. Thisresult indicates an inverse relation between the 
level of non-audit fees and the amount of goodwill impairment and provides additional support 
for the findings in the main analysis. 
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6.2 Non-Audit Fees and the Time Until Impairment 
 
In addition to demonstrating likelihood and amount characteristics, Hayn and Hughes 
(2006) find that goodwill impairments are also subject to timing decisions by companies. This 
timing aspect introduces an additional avenue for testing the impact of non-audit fees on 
goodwill impairment decisions. Auditors that are fully independent should, on average, require 
that their clients impair goodwill at the proper time. If non-audit fees have a negative impact on 
auditor independence, however, the length of time it takes to actually record an impairment 
would be longer. I further analyze the potential impact of non-audit fees on goodwill impairment 
decisions by using duration, or survival, analysis to examine the length of time before a write-off 
occurs.22,23 The variable of interest in this analysis remain the same as in tests of H1, although 
the direction of the coefficient has the opposite maning. A positive and significant coefficient 
on the variable LN_NONAUDIT would provide evidence that higher levels of non-audit fees are 
associated with a longer lag in time until impairment and would provide evidence of a negative 
effect of non-audit fees on properly impairing goodwill. For this analysis, a company joins the 
analysis the first-time its market-to-book ratio falls below one and remains in the sample until its 
market-to-book is no longer less than one or impairment occurs.24 Observations that occur after a 
company initially exits the sample, either through an improvement in market-to-book ratio or by 
                                                 
 
22 See Beatty et al. (2002), Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008), and Tse and Tucker (2010) for examples of this type of 
analysis in accounting literature. 
23 Duration analysis estimates the probability that a firm impairs its goodwill given that it remains in the sample and 
has not previously recorded a goodwill impairment during its tenure in the sample. In this setting, tests of the data 
suggest that the appropriate duration model is a par metric model (i.e. changes in covariates affect the time until an 
event) with a log-logistic functional form. 
24 When testing duration, it is important to ensure observations are measured from the first point they ar  subject to 
treatment. The concern is that any “left-censoring” in the data could bias the results of the duration analysis. 
Because there is available data since the point SFAS 142 went into effect (for fiscal years beginning on or after 
December 15, 2001), I can be certain that I observe the first date each company enters the sample threshold. 
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recording some impairment, are not included. Control variables remain the same as those 
included in model (1). 
<Insert Table 8 Here>  
 Table 8 presents the results of the duration analysis. The positive and significant 
coefficient on LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.10) indicates that a higher level of non-audit fees is 
associated with a longer period of time until a company actually records a goodwill impairment. 
This result suggests that higher levels of non-audit fees are associated with clients that take 
longer to impair goodwill, again providing further support for the earlier findings. 
6.3 Goodwill Impairment Accuracy and Non-Audit Fees 
 
Although valuation services are specifically prohibited under current auditor 
independence standards, it could be argued that the expanded relationship created by a higher 
level of non-audit service work may actually have some spillover effects and improve an 
auditor’s understanding of a client’s goodwill environment (Simunic 1984). If this is the case, an 
improved understanding should result in the auditor making a more accurate assessment of 
goodwill and therefore making a better impairment decision. To consider the possibility that non-
audit fees actually improve goodwill impairment accuracy, I employ the residuals obtained from 
running model (1) and determine the absolute value of the difference between actual impairment 
outcome – the zero or one dichotomous variable – and the predicted probability from the logit 
regression. To test the relation between non-audit fees and this absolute error, I dichotomize non-
audit fees at the median and perform a univariate comparison of the absolute error between the 
subsample of companies with non-audit fees above the median and those with non-audit fees 
below the median. In untabulated results, I find that the average absolute error for the 1,807 
 
 27
companies with non-audit fees below the median is significantly less than the average error for 
the 1,808 companies with non-audit fees above the median (p < 0.10).25 These result suggests 
that goodwill impairment accuracy is actually worse for those companies that have a higher level 
of non-audit fees, helping to rule out the possibility that the observed negative relation between 
non-audit fees and goodwill impairments is actually the result of non-audit services improving 
impairment accuracy. 
6.4 Client Importance and the Effect of Non-Audit Fees 
 
 Earlier analyses document an average negative effect of non-audit fees on auditor 
independence. It is possible, however, that the reduction in independence only occurs for those 
clients that are most important to the auditor. I explore this possibility by considering two 
proxies for client importance. First, I compare theeffects of non-audit fees for those companies 
above the median market value of equity for the sample to those below the median. Second, I 
compare the effects of non-audit fees for those clients above the median level of office influence, 
defined as total company fees as a percentage of total office fees, to those below the median level 
of office influence.26 I expect that non-audit fees for those companies that are larger and/or more 
influential to their respective audit office to have the most impact on reducing auditor 
independence. Consistent with this expectation, untabulated results from each of these analyses 
exhibit negative and significant interaction between LN_NONAUDIT and the measure of client 
importance (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively). Further, the significant negative linear 
                                                 
 
25 To further test accuracy, I develop a prediction model using an ‘out-of-sample’ testing technique to ensure that 
absolute error is not mechanically related to the prediction itself. This technique is implemented by running equation 
(1) on a randomly drawn quarter of the original sample, and then using the predictions obtained from this regression 
to compute the absolute impairment errors for the remaining 75 percent of the sample. Results from this technique 
continue to show that companies with non-audit feesabove the median have a statistically worse accuray than those 
below the median (p < 0.05). 
26 Because total office fees also include the non-audit fees considered throughout this paper, I also reperform 
analyses after calculating office influence based only n audit fees. Results are unchanged. 
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combinations in each regression (both p < 0.01) indicate that the negative effect for important 
clients alone is significantly different than zero, while the coefficients on LN_NONAUDIT 
suggest no negative effects for those clients that could be considered less important. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the most important clients may be driving the negative 
effects that non-audit fees have on auditor independence. 
6.5 Additional Robustness 
 
6.5.1Propensity Score Matching  
 
Several papers have noted that functional form misspecification (non-linearity) between 
the dependent variable, the independent variable of interest, and/or the control variables can 
cause potential bias in the estimated coefficients (Armstrong et al. 2012; Lawrence et al. 2011). 
These studies use a propensity score matching process introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) to adjust for any functional form misspecificat on that may be present. Following these 
studies, I also perform the estimations of model (1) on a propensity score matched subsample.27 
The matching process uses a logit model to develop scores measuring the ‘propensity’ of a 
company for having an impairment based on the observable client characteristics, other than the 
variable of interest.28 This matching allows comparison of a sample of companies that have a 
goodwill impairment to companies that do not have a goodwill impairment but are similar in all 
other observable characteristics. Untabulated results from analyses using the propensity-matched 
                                                 
 
27 I employ the propensity matching procedure in a manner similar to Francis et al. (2012), where the dependent 
variable in the match is the same as the dependent variable in the main model. This process ensures that companies 
in the matched subsamples are similar on all observable characteristics, while still allowing for variation in the 
variable of interest (LN_NONAUDIT). Matching occurs without replacement and within a m ximum caliper distance 
of three percent. 
28 Because the matching process allows for companies to be matched based on observable characteristics, all 
companies with a material level of goodwill, not just those with a market-to-book less than one, could be used as a 
starting point for the propensity score match. When all companies with material goodwill are used in the matching 
process, inferences remain unchanged. 
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samples remain highly significant, further suggesting hat non-audit fees have a negative relation 
with the likelihood of having a material goodwill impairment. These findings suggest that the 
initial results regarding the relation between non-audit fees and goodwill impairments are likely 
not the product of functional form misspecification due to differences in observable 
characteristics between the subsamples of companies that impair and those that do not.  
6.5.2 Materiality of Impairment 
 
 Throughout this study, I define IMP as a material impairment in order to reduce potential 
statistical noise that may be introduced by immateri l goodwill write-offs.  To ensure that my 
results are not influenced by this decision, I perform two additional analyses. First, I eliminate 
the materiality requirement and include all impairments. Second, I exclude the observations with 
an immaterial impairment completely and analyze only those observations with a material 
impairment or no impairment. In untabulated tests, I find that both results remain unchanged 
from earlier findings.  This indicates that the results do not appear to be driven by the decision to 






 This study employs goodwill impairments to examine auditor independence. More 
specifically, goodwill impairments are used to measure the effects of non-audit fees on an 
auditor’s independence from a client. Prior studies in this area have potentially suffered from 
research limitations and goodwill impairments offer s veral benefits to address these limitations. 
Capital markets can be used to create an appropriate sample of companies with a high probability 
of having their goodwill impaired, establishing an appropriate counterfactual sample. 
Furthermore, goodwill impairments are not nearly as limited in the number of occurrences (lack 
of power) or in the types of companies potentially affected (sample bias). In addition to 
addressing these limitations, goodwill impairments al o provide an interesting setting as they 
offer the potential to assess how non-audit fees affect magnitude and timing decisions.  
Using a sample of companies with material goodwill and a market-indicated impairment, 
I examine whether non-audit fees play a statistically significant role in the likelihood that a 
goodwill impairment is recorded. If auditors are behaving less independently, it will result in a 
significant lowering of the likelihood that a company receives a goodwill impairment. Consistent 
with this possibility, results indicate a negative r lation between non-audit fees and the 
likelihood of receiving a goodwill impairment. Additional tests suggest that higher levels of non-
audit fees are also associated with lower impairment amounts and a longer time lag until 
impairment occurs. Taken together, the results of these analyses suggest that clients that pay 
higher amounts of non-audit fees may be receiving preferential treatment regarding the 
impairment of their goodwill. Further, analyses suggest that the lack of results in prior non-audit 




The results of this paper provide valuable insights to regulators and investors in a setting 
other than going concern modifications and help to reconcile the seemingly arbitrary concerns 
continually expressed by regulators and investors about potential negative consequences of non-
audit service fees with the lack of results documented in prior research. These findings suggest 
that the understanding of the relation between non-audit fees and auditor independence may be 
less complete than previously thought and indicate a n ed for continued research into this area.  
It is important to note that this research is subject to potential limitations. As with most 
research, any inferences from this study are subject to the ability of recording a goodwill 
impairment to capture the construct of auditor independence. Additionally, it is important that 
caution be taken when inferring causality. Any causal results are limited by each model’s ability 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
Table 1 outlines the selection process for both the full sample used in the likelihood and amount analyses and the 
reduced sampled employed in the duration analysis. 
 




       
Sample for Likelihood and Amount Analyses:  
       
Number of observations with all required Compustat data (fiscal years 2004 through 2011)  32,399  
  
Less:  
Observations without necessary stock price information in CRSP (5,161) 
Observations without necessary fee data in Audit Analytics (4,477) 
Observations without a material level of goodwill  (906) 
Observations without a market value that is less than book value  (18,150) 
Observations without a market value that is materially less than book value (82) 
Observations within industries that have no variation in impairment outcome 
(variation is necessary to perform logit model analysis) (8) 
  
Total observations meeting full sample criteria 3,615 
       
Sample for Duration Analyses:  
  
Total observations meeting full sample criteria (from above) 3,615 
       
Less:       
Observations that occur after a company first exits the sample (i.e., either impairs 
goodwill or market-to-book improves)  (1,212) 
  
Total observations meeting duration analysis criteria 2,410 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 3,615 firm-year observations.  Panel B of 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for thewo subsamples of interest: IMP=0 (no material goodwill 
impairment present) and IMP=1 (material goodwill impairment present).  The last column of Panel B presents the 
two-tailed t-statistics of the difference between the wo subsamples. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). 
 
Panel A: Full Sample               
      Standard       
Variable N Mean Deviation p(25) Median p(75)   
IMP  3,615  0.351 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NONAUDIT_FEES  3,615  0.477 2.412 0.020 0.076 0.234 
AUDIT_FEES  3,615  2.078 7.072 0.258 0.679 1.600 
TOTAL_FEES  3,615  2.556 9.155 0.323 0.773 1.898  
BIGN  3,615  0.559 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MKVALT  3,615  1,235.075 7,069.408 31.500 99.008 392.280 
IMP_PCT  3,615  0.130 0.133 0.032 0.077 0.192 
GDWL_PCT  3,615  0.153 0.181 0.020 0.074 0.236 
LOSS  3,615  0.399 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LEVERAGE  3,615  1.136 2.719 0.169 0.557 1.280 
ROA  3,615  -0.020 0.194 -0.029 0.005 0.035 
GW_ACQ  3,615  0.472 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EBITDA_CHANGE  3,615  -13.787 630.090 -0.163 -0.020 0.046 
SEGMENTS  3,615  2.249 1.738 1.000 1.000 3.000 
ANN_RETURN  3,615  -0.279 0.829 -0.606 -0.355 -0.072 
STDEV  3,615  0.167 0.485 0.094 0.139 0.199   
Panel B: Comparison of Impairment and Non-Impairment Companies         
  IMP = 0 IMP = 1     
Variable N Mean N Mean Difference t-statistic   
NONAUDIT_FEES  2,345  0.495  1,270  0.444  0.051  0.656 
AUDIT_FEES  2,345  2.049  1,270  2.133  (0.084) -0.336 
TOTAL_FEES  2,345  2.543  1,270  2.578  (0.035) -0.108  
BIGN  2,345  0.527  1,270  0.617  (0.090) -5.301 *** 
MKVALT  2,345  1,425.329  1,270  883.780  541.549  2.459 ** 
IMP_PCT  2,345  0.099  1,270  0.188  (0.089) -18.503 *** 
GDWL_PCT  2,345  0.120  1,270  0.215  (0.095) 18.323 *** 
LOSS  2,345  0.273  1,270  0.631  (0.358) -21.818 *** 
LEVERAGE  2,345  1.085  1,270  1.230  (0.145) -1.342 
ROA  2,345  0.008  1,270  -0.071  0.079  9.501 *** 
GW_ACQ  2,345  0.449  1,270  0.513  (0.064) -3.700 *** 
EBITDA_CHANGE  2,345  -21.053  1,270  -0.372  (20.681) -1.280 
SEGMENTS  2,345  2.233  1,270  2.279  (0.046) -0.754 
ANN_RETURN  2,345  -0.184  1,270  -0.455  0.271  7.785 *** 




Table 3: Impairment Likelihood Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of mdel (1) on the full sample of observations having a market-to-
book less than one. The dependent variable is IMP. The variable of interest is the natural log of non-audit fees 
(LN_NONAUDIT). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industry and year specific intercepts are not included 
for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
    (1) 
VARIABLES IMP 





























   
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations   3,615 
Pseudo R-squared  0.254 
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Table 4: Limited Sample Power Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the limited sample power analysis. The dependent variable in each logit re ression is 
IMP. The natural log of non-audit fees is the variable of interest in all regressions. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.  Year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests). 
 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IMP IMP IMP IMP IMP 
            
LN_NONAUDIT -0.179 -0.225 -0.158 -0.369 -0.241 
(-0.463) (-0.519) (-0.435) (-0.899) (-0.733) 
LN_FEES 0.0944 -0.188 0.259 0.179 0.0852 
(0.308) (-0.558) (0.836) (0.553) (0.282) 
   
Additional Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
   
Observations 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 
   
      
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES IMP IMP IMP IMP IMP 
       
LN_NONAUDIT -0.943** -0.221 -0.329 -0.732* -0.746 
 (-2.237) (-0.573) (-0.912) (-1.723) (-1.565) 
LN_FEES 0.336 0.107 0.264 0.377 -0.264 
 (1.016) (0.323) (0.827) (1.155) (-0.811) 
      
Additional Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Observations 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 
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Table 5: Analysis of Potential of Sample Bias (Subsequent Viability) 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis examining the potential of sample bias due to auditor concer s of 
subsequent viability. Subsequent viability is proxied for by including an indicator for those clients that received a 
going concern modification (GC). The dependent variable in this logit regression is IMP. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.  Industry and year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics 
are presented in parentheses in column 2.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
  
    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coefficient Z-statistic Significance 
          
LN_NONAUDIT -0.557 (-2.996) *** 
LN_NAS_x_GC 2.161 (1.458) 
GC 0.045 (0.155) 
LN_FEES  0.837 (4.655) *** 
BIGN  0.359 (2.911) *** 
LN_MKVALT  -0.069 (-1.227)  
MAT_IMPAIR_PERCENT  4.063 (7.981) *** 
GDWL_PCT  2.756 (7.900) *** 
LOSS  1.100 (8.353) *** 
LEVERAGE  0.045 (1.879) * 
ROA  -1.467 (-2.508) ** 
GW_ACQ  0.179 (1.977) ** 
EBITDA_CHANGE  0.001 (2.660) *** 
LN_SEGMENTS  0.050 (0.652)  
ANN_RETURN  -0.236 (-0.573)  
STDEV  1.624 (2.495) ** 
     
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Included 
  
Observations   3,615 
  
Linear Combinations   





Table 6: Analysis of Potential of Sample Bias (Litigation Risk) 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the analyses examining the potential of sample bias due to auditor concer s of 
litigation risk. Litigation risk is proxied for by including an indicator for those clients that are in a litigious industry 
(LITIGATION). The dependent variable in this logit regression is IMP. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in 
parentheses in column 2.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based 
on two-tailed tests).  
 
  
    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coefficient Z-statistic Significance 
          
LN_NONAUDIT -0.453 (-2.584) ***  
LN_NAS_x_LITIGATION 0.671 (2.119) **  
LITIGATION -0.198 (-1.490) 
LN_FEES  0.546 (3.689) *** 
BIGN  0.243 (2.104) ** 
LN_MKVALT  0.014 (0.285)  
MAT_IMPAIR_PERCENT  3.604 (7.787) *** 
GDWL_PCT  1.870 (7.310) *** 
LOSS  1.115 (8.807) *** 
LEVERAGE  0.070 (1.627)  
ROA  -1.179 (-2.167) ** 
GW_ACQ  0.149 (1.690) * 
EBITDA_CHANGE  0.001 (2.044) ** 
LN_SEGMENTS  -0.109 (-1.617)  
ANN_RETURN  -0.381 (-0.784)  
STDEV  1.890 (3.116) *** 
     
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Included 
  
Observations   3,615 
  
Linear Combinations   






Table 7: Impairment Amount Analysis 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the tobit analysis on the full sample of observations. The dependent variable is the 
continuous variable IMP_AMT. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  Industry and year specific intercepts are 
not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust t- atistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients.  *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
    (1) 
VARIABLES IMP_AMT 





























   
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Included 




Table 8: Impairment Timing Analysis 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the duration analysis. The dependent variable is time until failure (when IMP = 1) 
occurs. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  Industry and year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients.  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
    (1) 
VARIABLES TIME 





























   
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Number of Subjects (Companies)   1,580 
Number of Failures (Impairments)  871 






Appendix B: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Variable Definition 
ANN_RETURN Company’s buy and hold stock return over the current y ar. 
AUDIT_FEES Sum of audit fees (in millions) paid to current fiscal year auditor. 
BIGN Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by a Big N firm, 0 
otherwise.  
EBITDA_CHANGE Change in a company’s EBITDA from prior period scaled by its market 
value of equity. 
GC Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s auditor included a going 
concern modification as part of the auditor’s report, 0 otherwise. 
GDWL_PCT Pre-impairment percentage of a company’s assets tha is composed of 
goodwill. 
GW_ACQ Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company performed an acquisition that 
increased goodwill during the current year, 0 otherwise. 
IMP Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company recorded a material goodwill 
impairment during the fiscal year (defined as a goodwill impairment 
greater than 0.5 percent of revenues), 0 otherwise. 
IMP_AMT Continuous variable equal to the amount of a company’s goodwill 
impairment divided by its pre-impairment total goodwill. 
IMP_PCT Percentage that a company’s market value of assets i  below book value of 
assets. 
IND_FE Indicator variables for each two-digit SIC classification. 
LITIGATION Indicator variable equal to 1 if a company’s industry is biotechnology (SIC 
codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), or retailing (SIC codes 
5200-5961), 0 otherwise. 
LEVERAGE Total short- and long-term interest bearing debt divided by pre-impairment 
book value of equity. 
LN_AUDITFEES Natural log of the sum of audit fees paid to current fiscal year auditor. 
LN_MKVALT Natural log of the company’s market value of equity.   
LN_NONAUDIT Natural log of the sum of non-audit fees paid to current fiscal year auditor. 
LN_SEGMENTS Natural log of the company’s number of segments. 
LN_TOTALFEES Natural log of the sum of total fees paid to current fiscal year auditor. 
LOSS  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company suffered a pre-impairment loss 
for the fiscal year ended, 0 otherwise. 
MKTBOOK Ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
MKVALT Company’s market value of equity (in millions).   
NONAUDIT_FEES Sum of non-audit fees (in millions) paid to current fiscal year auditor. 
ROA Pre-impairment net income divided by average total assets for the year. 
SEGMENTS Company’s number of segments. 
STDEV Standard deviation of a company’s stock returns over the current year. 
TIME Number of consecutive years that a company’s market-to-book ratio is less 
than one and the company does not record a material goodwill impairment. 
TOTAL_FEES Sum of all fees (in millions) paid to current fiscal year auditor. 
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